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Free markets for health care in Africa do not function properly, in that pa-
tients exhibit willingness to pay for health care and yet practitioners are unable
to sell their services. It is widely acknowledged that health markets everywhere
are troubled with imperfect information. Therefore it is no surprise that free
markets and spot contracts do not lead to an efficiently functioning market
for health care. When issues of agency are not resolved we find practitioners
specializing in the sale of Pharmaceuticals but not using their skills as diagnos-
ticians. Mechanisms that can reduce agency cost are beneficial to both patients
and practitioners.
This paper draws on theory and empirical evidence to examine what insti-
tutions are necessary to solve the problems of imperfect information in this con-
text. We dismiss government regulation because the regulatory capacity does
not exist in most African countries. Theory suggests that self-regulation by
professional bodies should arise as privatization continues. Empirical evidence,
however, suggests that this conclusion is overly-optimistic. On the other hand,
referral networks perform much the same function but do not require central-
ized control. The most successful institution for the delivery of quality medical
care in Africa is that of independent, pre-existing value-based organizations
(missions) and we suggest their choice of institutional form has contributed to
their success.
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1 Introduction
With Africa in prolonged economic crisis, most of its states in fiscal collapse, and
pressures from the World Bank for Structural Adjustment, most sectors of the con-
tinent's economies have been increasingly privatized. All too frequently, however,
the "miracle of the market" has not followed. This failure is particularly acute in
the health sector. It is widely acknowledged that markets for health everywhere fail
to meet one of neoclassical economics' assumptions for fully competitive markets.
They are troubled with imperfect information, in that someone who is sick and seeks
medical treatment (the principal) cannot assess the appropriateness and quality of
the effort the health practitioner (her agent) is making on her behalf. Without in-
stitutions or mechanisms to overcome the principal-agent problem, the market for
health will not operate in an economically optimal manner. Therefore it is no sur-
prise that free markets and spot contracts do not lead to an efficiently functioning
market for health care. Individuals can simply try to cope with the problem or
institutions can arise to govern and facilitate relationships between individuals. We
will show that American solutions often do not work in Africa. What institutions
might then overcome this principal-agent problem in medicine on the continent?
To answer this question we examine the institutions currently operating in Africa
to mitigate these problems. We draw on the research completed in a seven country
African collaborative project in which we participated (Leonard, ed 1999). The
project examined the changing markets for both human and animal health care on
the continent, with independent research projects in each country. Although we
concentrate on medical care for humans in this article, we also use research done on
veterinary medicine. The biological science underlying the two professions is nearly
identical and they are organized in very similar ways. Veterinary care in Africa
is particularly interesting, because over the last dozen years it has moved rapidly
from being more dominated by the state than human health was to now being
substantially more private. The health and veterinary markets in Africa therefore
nicely illuminate one another1.
In addition to the information gained from the research project we draw from
three bodies of literature. The literature on institutions of health care delivery in
the west offers a contrast to the African situation and illuminates the importance
of 'macro' institutions (such as functioning court systems) for the sustainability
of other institutions. The literature on health care delivery in Africa informs our
discussion of the behavior of individuals in their search for health care. A third
source is the literature on mechanism design which provides a framework for the
discussion of existing structures and patterns and allows us to make predictions
about the success or failure of potential mechanisms or institutions.
The areas studied in the research project and in the literature on health care in
Africa offer variety in both institutional and technological environments, allowing
us to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of existing and potential institu-
tions. The paper is framed by a theoretical exposition of agency, starting with
moral hazard, observable and unobservable efforts, and discussing institutions and
technologies that allow for enforceable contracts to deliver unobservable effort. Sub-
sequently problems of adverse selection are analyzed and potential solutions are ex-
amined. Many of the candidate institutions for moral hazard and adverse selection
in African health in fact are similar.
We identify three types of mechanisms or institutions that can resolve these
problems. The first type are decentralized mechanisms that exist because of partic-
ular technological features either of their environment or of pre-existing institutions.
These mechanisms do not rely on governments or other pre-existing organizations
for their existence and in theory should form wherever the exogenously determined
environment allows and where superior institutions do not exist. By assuming some
degree of rationality (and drawing from studies of patient behavior to back this
up) we can learn a great deal about conditions necessary for these types of insti-
tutions, because we can infer that where they do not exist there is a technological
1For more on the mutual relevance of veterinary and human medicine, especially in Africa,
see Schwabe (1984); Majok and Schwabe (1996, p. 128).
or institutional barrier to their formation. These mechanisms, although helpful, are
nonetheless sub-optimal (they cannot achieve the solutions that could be obtained
in the absence of agency), implying that there is room for other institutions that
can achieve superior solutions.
There is also the potential for institutions that are autonomous of existing or-
ganizations but require some degree of coordination. These would be institutions
managed by medical professionals and independent of governments or pre-existing
organizations. We specifically examine professional self-regulation and referral net-
works. Such institutions are not generally present in Africa, but it is difficult to
conclude why, because collective action issues coupled with the short time period
since deregulation clouds evaluation of 'rationality'. In other words, it is difficult to
conclude that because they have not formed they will not form. We do, however,
find strong evidence to suggest that self-regulation by professionals is unlikely to
occur, but hold out the possibility that effective referral networks might form and
serve the role of reducing agency costs.
A third type of institution is one that relies on a pre-existing organization. In
Africa the relevant organizations are government agencies and non-governmental
organizations (NGO's), specifically churches and missions. Both organizations use
the institution of hierarchical supervision. We find strong evidence that existing
mission health facilities are effectively using this institution to deliver high quality
health care that resolves, to some degree, the problems of agency. On the other
hand governments, though using the same institution, fail to utilize it effectively
and generally provide low quality care despite great expense in training, facilities,
and supplies. Unlike decentralized mechanisms or autonomous institutions, the
existence of effective organizations is an exogenous event. This study recommends
that existing and effective organizations take or be allowed to take a more active
role in the provision of health care, both extending their current reach and replacing
many traditionally government services.
2 The Established View of Health Markets
2.1 In the Economics Literature
Economic theorizing about health care implicitly derives from the "medical model"
of Parsons (1951, Chap. 10). Parsons saw the patient as an inadequately informed
and hence passive recipient of care from an omniscient physician. Economics has gen-
eralized this medical model as a principal-agent one and characterized the patient/
principal as suffering from imperfect information in her health care transactions
(Arrow 1963, Dranove and White 1987, Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985).
The costs of principal-agent transactions are particularly manifest in what are
called moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Moral hazard arises when one
or both of the parties to a transaction is unable to effectively monitor the effort the
other devotes to the production of the contracted good. If a principal is unable to
observe the extent to which the agent is doing quality work on her behalf, she may
have difficulty providing adequate incentives to induce that quality. If this problem
is unresolved the principal will not pay for quality even if it is potentially available.
Adverse selection occurs when some agents possess a characteristic that is of use
in treatment but cannot be detected by principals. These quality practitioners will
not be paid for the extra value of the product they possess, and when acquiring the
characteristic has costs, they will be driven out of the market by those who do not
acquire the valuable characteristic. Moral hazard and adverse selection create losses
for both the principal and the agent; the former is unable to get quality for which
she is willing to pay, while the later is unable to be paid for quality that he is able
and willing to provide.2
Given losses introduced by the nature of the relationship between the patient and
the physician the question then is, what kind of incentive or institutional structure
2
 This branch of the literature is in superficial contrast to the branch concerning issues of insur-
ance in health care. In that literature moral hazard refers to an increased demand for services by
patients because insurance reduces the marginal price. Adverse selection refers to the possibility
that insurance companies might attract patients with above average risks (Pauly 1974). In both
literatures, however, moral hazard refers to hidden action problems and adverse selection refers to
hidden information ones (Arrow 1985). In any case we do not discuss insurance in this article.
can be created that will induce the agent to consistently provide high quality services
even though principals do not know whether or not he has done so? The literature on
agency in health care suggests three, interacting, potential solutions to this question.
First, long-term associations increase the value to agents of their relationships
with principals and give principals more information about the likelihood that effort
is being provided. This makes limited monitoring by the principal more effective,
for it increases the value of the threat to sever future connections if something is
found to be wrong. However, in Africa most health care is currently subsidized,
removing the sting of any such threat. Though privatization is occurring it is cur-
rently difficult to lure professionals to private practice outside elite, urban markets
and thus patients have few non-subsidized alternatives. The literature also suggests
that clients might have long-term associations with organizations such as hospi-
tals, primary-care physicians or insurance companies to the same benefit. We will
examine such relationships in this paper.
Second, a "large stock of value that could be lost through bad behavior, such as
reputation or assets subject to suit, is a strong incentive for good behavior." If the
penalty is a large fine and is paid by the faulty practitioner to the aggrieved client,
as in a malpractice suit, the latter has considerable incentive to collect it (Pratt and
Zeckhauser 1985, pp. 12-13). This solution requires both that the failure to engage
in appropriate professional behavior can be proven to a third party (verifiability)
and that institutions exist through which a suit can be successfully brought. Verifi-
cation of professional effort is difficult in medicine, as there is a stochastic element
to recovery and as the client is often the only person who knows the outcome of
treatment. As the client stands to gain from the malpractice suit, her testimony may
be biased. For these reasons, the courts work only as an institution for punishing
bad professional behavior, not for inducing excellence. A further issue makes this
solution problematic in Africa, however — access to the legal system is expensive
and the courts themselves may well be corrupt. The ability of the average African to
use a court successfully against a member of the educated elite is doubtful. As North
(1990, p. 33) remarks, "one cannot take enforcement for granted. It is (and always
has been) the critical obstacle to increased specialization and the division of labor."
Third, as is more common, the loss of a "large stock of value" for poor perfor-
mance by the practitioner can be the revocation of the right to practice or have
access to clients. Unlike malpractice suits, the loss to the practitioner is no gain to
the client. This makes the testimony of the client about the success of treatment
more reliable, by removing a major incentive for her to be biased. On the other hand
it also removes her incentive to seek reparation and therefore this solution depends
on the existence of a body that will monitor and enforce professional standards. In
France and large parts of Africa the state plays this regulatory function. The same
governmental incompetence and corruption that makes privatization attractive to
Africa renders the state unreliable as a regulator, however. Anglo-Saxon countries
instead have relied upon self-regulation by professional associations, which not only
control licenses but hospital privileges as well. In addition referral networks among
physicians can accomplish many of the same results. Self-regulating professional
associations and referral networks do not currently exist in Africa; we will discuss
their potential later in this paper.
Western markets for health rely on three centralized institutions that we do not
observe in Africa. They require either effective courts, a group of professionals who
will benefit from and can lead their profession to self-regulation or effective referral
networks, or a government that is willing and able to perform a regulatory function.
None of these currently function effectively in Africa north of Zimbabwe.
2.2 In the African Health Literature
The empirical literature on health care in Africa demonstrates quite conclusively
that, in contrast to the "medical model," the sick are not passive in their use of
the health care system but instead are actively making choices between an array of
options. For example, babies in Burkina Faso may be delivered by professionals, tra-
ditional birth attendants, or the "old woman of the village" (Nougtara et al. 1989).
The sick frequently have been documented as seeking assistance from among gov-
ernment clinics and hospitals, mission facilities, for-profit private practitioners and
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traditional healers. The choices made often are explained by factors unrelated to
medicine, such as price and distance, or by static attributes of the facilities, such as
availability of drugs or perceived quality (Cameroun: Litvack and Bodart (1993);
Ghana: Waddington and Enyimayew (1989); Nigeria: Omorodion (1993) and Stock
(1983); Swaziland: Yoder (1989); and Tanzania: Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992)).
None of these factors contradict the image of the sick as passive recipients of health
care from providers whose methods of operation are obscured in a 'black box.' An-
other group of studies, however, indicates that choice is being guided by the char-
acter or severity of the illness (Benin: Bichmann et al. (1991); Burkina Faso: Sauer-
born et al. (1989); Kenya: Mwabu (1986); and Cameroun: Leonard (1998a), Ndeso-
Atanga (1999)). Sometimes these studies cast doubt on the appropriateness of the
judgements being made (Mali: Coppo et al. (1992)). But as a group this body of
research suggests that the sick may be less ignorant about the kinds of medical
treatment they require than the traditional medical model has implied.
That the sick in Africa are self-referring suggests a deficiency in the classical
principal-agent health model, which portrays them as wholly guided by regulated
professionals. Society-wide institutions to assure professional standards, which are
assumed by the medical model, are not effective in Africa. Patients instead are
choosing between institutions and organizations that regulate their practitioners in
different ways and to different degrees. We will present evidence in Section 3.7 that
these choices reflect understanding of the ability of different institutions to solve the
agency problem.
3 Moral Hazard
As noted above, moral hazard arises when one or both of the parties to a transaction
is unable to effectively monitor the effort the other devotes to the production of the
contracted good. If a principal is unable to observe the extent to which the agent
is doing quality work on her behalf, she may have difficulty providing adequate
incentives to induce that quality. If this problem is unresolved, the principal will
be willing to pay only the value of inferior quality work, for that is all she can be
sure of getting. To analyze the possibilities for solutions, we first must establish a
general model.
3.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
We follow Grossman (1975) and model the benefit of health care as an increase in
health stock. Health stock determines time available for work and leisure. This
stock depreciates over time, can be increased by investment in health care and is
subject to negative shocks from illness. In our model individuals purchase health
care because they have received a negative shock to their health stock that creates
a demand for investment in health.
There are two possible outcomes (X) of treatment, either X = p, (cured) or
X = fj, (not cured). Without loss of generalization we set /i = 0. There are two
binomial distributions that describe treatment, </>ful (meant to invoke the idea that
all parties to treatment contribute all possible resources) and 0none(no resources are
contributed), where the probability of X = ft is equal to ph for the distribution 0full
and the probability of X = p, is equal to p\ for the distribution 0none.
We introduce an arbitrary technology e (0 < e < 1) that describes a combination
of the 0full distribution and the 0none distribution. Thus
X = e • 0fuli + (1 - e) • 0none (1)
We deliberately based this description of X on the Spanning Condition of Grossman
and Hart (1983) and the Linear Distribution Function Condition (LDFC) of Hart
and Holmstrom (1987), which will allow us to characterize incentive compatibility
constraints as first order conditions3.
3Mirlees (1975) (as cited in Hart and Holmstrom (1987)) shows that the first order conditions
do not describe globally optimal actions for distributions such asX = e + 9orX = e-9 when 6 is
any of the standard candidates for random distributions. Thus in order to obtain some theoretical
results the choice of functional form for X is crucial. We follow this convention so that our results
match with those of the theoretical literature, however, to our knowledge no similar restriction has
been shown to exist in practice. "The extreme sensitivity to informational variables that comes
across from this type of model is at odds with reality." (Hart and Holmstrom 1987)
We can rewrite e as a function of the best possible outcome by introducing a
new variable \x and setting it equal to e • Ji. Thus we can rewrite the above as
X=£' Kn + (1 - 3) ' 0none (2)
We can solve for the expected value of X as follows.
) (3)
1=0,fi
This simplifies to fi(ph — Pi) + pi • fi. The expected outcome of treatment is the
probability of full recovery with no intervention plus the premium on the spanning
technology (ph — Pi) times the magnitude of the intervention, fi.
The value of treatment is the outcome multiplied by a unit constant parameter,
UJ. In the case of human health care u can be interpreted as the opportunity cost
of healthy time (wage), and in the case of veterinary care, the value of productivity
in a healthy animal.
If the technology fi could be purchased on the open market the client would
purchase Jl units of /x if u • (ph — Pi) were greater than v^ and zero units if u •
{Ph — Pi) < /^i) where v^ is the per unit cost of \i. However fi (health production)
is not a good that can be purchased on the open market but rather is the prod-
uct of goods, some of which can be purchased and some of which cannot. Thus
fi = /(^client, ^pract, c^ondition, a, &) where ^Hent is the set of characteristics of the
client, ^pract is the set of characteristics of the practitioner and c^ondition is the set
of characteristics of the condition reported, a is the effort of the practitioner and b
is the effort of the client.
3.2 Capacity
Practitioners provide two things in the production of yu, capacity (TT € ^pract) and
effort (a). It is helpful to make this distinction between the capacity of a medical
provider and the effort he exerts in using it. Capacity such as the presence of
equipment is relatively easy for clients to asses. Capacity such as the skills of
providers can be more difficult to asses. To the degree that capacity is observable
a market will develop in which practitioners who possess the capacity can charge
higher prices than those who do not. The choice to invest in capacity will then
depend on benefit of that capacity to clients as well as its cost. For those elements
of capacity that are unobservable there is the potential for adverse selection and
under-investment. This is discussed in section 4.
3.3 Observable Effort
Being in the best hospital with the best physicians is of little use if no one will pay
any attention to you. The value of the effort can be generally represented in the
continuous case as JJ • -^ • (ph — pi) and if effort were sold in the market the patient
would purchase effort up to the point where its marginal value equals its per unit
cost (va).
There are features of a health facility and its clinicians that do indicate effort
and that would be visible even to the untrained observer - (i) the degree to which
adequate quantities of Pharmaceuticals are maintained in stock; (ii) the propensity
to prescribe treatment and the quantity of drugs given; (iii) the frequency with which
prescriptions are given by injection rather than orally; (iv) the 'clinical manner' (also
known as 'bedside manner') of the attending practitioners; and (v) the adequacy
of instruction given to patients as to how to use their prescriptions and how to
prevent recurrence of the problem. The first four items on the preceding list are
acknowledged in the literature as influential in patient choice and satisfaction in
Africa (Bichmann et al. 1991, Litvack and Bodart 1993, Omorodion 1993, Stock
1983, Waddington and Enyimayew 1989).
When health care is sold in the free market these efforts can be purchased at
their value to the patient. If a = ]TZ ai • Ji the value of any type of effort is
Ii' TiUKl ' jl ' (Ph ~P^ an<^ c^ e n^ s w ^ continue to purchase it until its value equals
the cost. In a market for health, practitioners could compete on their provision of
observable effort rather than negotiating the level with each patient. Even when
10
their services are subsidized or prices are set exogenously we expect that side-
payments (very common in Africa) would lead to improved provision of observable
efforts.
3.4 Unobservable Effort
Effort is not always observable. Assume that a is not observable, that \i — a (fi is a
direct function only of practitioner effort), and that a 6 {0,1} (the practitioner can
either exert a fixed amount of effort or not exert any effort). The client engages the
practitioner who then chooses whether or not to exert effort. The patient does not
observe the practitioner's choice of a but does observe X. In only two trivial cases
will the patient know for certain that the practitioner exerted effort.
The first is the case where pi = 0 and therefore when the client observes X = p,
(or X = fi) she can know effort was (was not) exerted. In the second case if the
practitioner were known to prefer a = 1 over a = 0 then this knowledge, rather
than any information gathered from observing X, would inform the patient that
the practitioner had exerted effort. In those circumstances even the observation
of X = fi should not change the client's belief that effort was exerted. Both are
trivial examples; patients often recover from diseases that were poorly diagnosed
and people rarely prefer exerting effort to shirking, ceteris paribus.
There is a disutility to exerting effort c(a). For this example we set the disutility
of no effort equal to zero and the disutility of exerting effort (a = 1) equal to 1. Now
the value to the practitioner of exerting effort is -1 and the value of not exerting
effort is 0. Any fixed payment to the practitioner will not change the dominance of
the no effort strategy over the effort strategy. If the client knows these disutilities
she will realize that no matter what outcome is observed the practitioner did not
exert effort. When \i = a there is therefore no reason to visit a practitioner.
If the patient offers to pay the practitioner some sum of money that is contingent
on the outcome observed (Px) she can induce the practitioner to exert effort. A
good example is the "pay only if cured" contract of Dranove and White (1987).
For a risk neutral practitioner the difference in expected values of the contingent
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payment when he exerts effort and when he does not must be greater than or equal
to the difference in the disutility of exerting effort and the disutility of not exerting
effort. Thus he will exert effort only if:
Px-Ph-l > Px-Pi-0 (4)
exert not exert
Px-{Ph-Pi) > 1
Assuming a contingent fee that is exactly enough to induce the practitioner to exert
effort the contract is beneficial to the client when the net benefit with the contingent
fee exceeds the benefit without the contingent fee. Thus the contingent fee contract
is better when the value of healthy time is higher or when the difference between
high and low effort expected outcomes is higher.
v • ((Ph - Pi) + Pr P-) - Px > u • (Pi • P) (5)
with cont. fee without cont. fee
u-(Ph~Pl)2 > 1
This scheme is what we will refer to as a contingent-fee contract. There can be
other fees paid but any contract that contains a contingent-fee is referred to as
a contingent-fee contract. Px can depend on a number of factors other than the
outcome (such as the value of the outcome) but must vary according to the outcome.
If there is more than one type of effort the patient can still purchase the observable
effort in the usual way and then write a contingent-contract over the unobservable
effort. The co-existence of efforts does not change the basic solution to the problem.
Numerous anthropological studies have observed that traditional healers in rural
Africa charge a nominal initial fee and expect the bulk of their income to come from
'appreciation' payments by the patient after successful treatment (Zaire: Korse et al.
(1989), Burundi: Baerts (1989), South Africa: Edwards (1983), Nigeria: Oyenye and
Orubuloye (1985), the Ivory Coast: Lasker (1981), Botswana: Staugard (1985), and
Zimbabwe: Gelfand et al. (1985) and general sources: Conco (1972)). A random
sample of 800 households in South-West Province of Cameroun (Leonard 1998a)
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suggests that patients who visit traditional healers make different payments de-
pending on the success of treatment. Two types of payments were identified in the
survey, those made before and those made after treatment. For patients who were
cured of their ailments the average total payment both before and after was 6,545
CFA, whereas those not cured paid 3,338 CFA (p=0.077). Payments made after
the initial consultation varied even more: 4,990 CFA in successful cases compared
to 1,384 CFA in unsuccessful cases (p=0.047). For visits to modern practitioners
payments are higher in unsuccessful cases4, though the difference is not significant.
It is rare (and generally considered un-ethical) for a modern medical practitioner
to make his fee contingent on the outcome of treatment. On the other hand we do
find circumstances in which the fixed fees are billed after the service is provided,
which either implicitly or explicitly involves a loan. If the practitioner knows that
his chances of collecting the fees are small if the outcome of the treatment is a
failure, the contract becomes a contingent payment one, with the implied incentive
effects to medical effort. We do not find this form of contract among modern human
health care providers in Africa. But we do find it in private veterinary practice,
where deferred fees are granted to livestock owners who have no liquidity problems
and clearly are using them to gain the benefits inherent in a contingent contract
(Kenya: D.K. Leonard, personal observation and G. Njiru, personal communica-
tion). Having observed this phenomenon and its incentive effects in Africa, we then
realized that a similar informal contract existed in US private practice before health
insurance became pervasive. Physicians of that era reported substantial amounts
of uncollectable fees (a third of gross was not uncommon). If repayment rates were
associated with outcomes a form of implicit contract was in use. Doctors were
reluctant to press the family for payment when the patient died, for example, an
inhibition that did not exist when an insurance company could be billed. Implicitly,
then, the development of insurance removed from the American health system one
of the institutions providing incentives for medical effort. Since the US had other
institutions in place that could achieve this incentive effect, the change may have
'Perhaps because unsuccessful cases require continued medication at additional expense.
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had only minor quality consequences there, although it might have contributed to
the decline in personal attention from physicians. Its absence in Africa, where the
anonymous character of most human health care and the weak loyalty of families to
particular medical providers makes credit impossible, is much more consequential
for practitioner effort.
3.4.1 Client Effort and Optimality Results
Under full information the optimal provision of health care would equate the marginal
value of practitioner effort with its marginal cost; —^—- = Q^ • When effort
is unobservable the client cannot choose the level of effort and the payment inde-
pendently — she can choose only the payment scheme. When both principal and
agent are risk neutral5 and only the agent undertakes unobservable effort a contract
in which the agent captures the full marginal value of his effort achieves the full
information solution. This does not mean that the agent has to be paid the full
value of the outcome, but that he receives the value of the marginal outcome. Thus
if Px = uX — ujfiph + PF (the value of the outcome minus the expected value of the
outcome plus a fixed fee) the expected payment is Pp, but the practitioner captures
the full value of the marginal income because Px changes one to one with LUX. With
a contract of this type the practitioner will exert effort such that the change in his
payment with the incremental unit of effort is exactly equal to its cost, achieving
the full information solution.
An important element in medical treatment, however, is the effort of the client
— either the sick individual (or her family), or the herder. Since the majority of
this effort takes place out of sight of the practitioner it is also unobservable. Were
the client to enter a contract in which all the reward or punishment from outcomes
were borne by the practitioner her incentive to exert effort would be reduced. It
is easiest to visualize this potential problem from the point of view of a herder.
Herder and practitioner enter a contract over the treatment of a sick animal. The
herder agrees to pay the practitioner the full value of restoring the animal to health
'Relaxing this assumption complicates the solution without changing the results substantially
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(minus fixed payments) if it is cured and nothing if it dies. This contract aligns
the incentives of the practitioner correctly and he will exert effort until its marginal
value equals its marginal disutility. But for a part of the treatment the animal is
in the herder's care. The herder must make sure the medication is properly taken,
avoid conditions that might stress the animal and generally nurse the animal back
to health. These actions require effort — effort that has opportunity costs — but
the practitioner cannot observe whether or not these things were done. In the north,
doctors (veterinarians) can admit humans (animals) and take the patient's care into
their own hands, but this usually does not happen in Africa. Even when patients
are admitted, the family frequently performs most of the routine nursing functions
as this reduces paid labor costs.
Thus \i is generally a function of both medical (a) and patient (6) effort as
well as other possible characteristics of the client, the practitioner or the disease
condition. When both a and b are unobservable it does not make sense for either
the practitioner or the client to earn the full value of the marginal outcome. To
achieve the best possible solution the contingent-payment contract will take the form
of a sharing-rule, in which the value of the marginal outcome is divided between
the client and the practitioner. Thus, for example, the practitioner might receive
Px = ruX + Pp and the client retain (1 — r)uX — Pp. If the value of treatment
must be completely consumed by payments to either the client or the practitioner
(conservative or budget-balanced contracts) we cannot achieve the same efficiency
as is produced by full information. This is because each of the parties receives only
a share of the return to their effort and will therefore exert less effort. However
sharing-rules are a distinct improvement over contracts that lack contingent-fees6.
A proof of this concept examines a contract in which the amount of the output
shared with the practitioner is very small. At this point the client has very strong
incentives to exert unobservable effort and the practitioner has almost no incentive
to exert unobservable effort. If the cost of exerting a unit of effort gets larger for
6
 For a theoretical discussion of contracts with joint production involving unobservable efforts
see Holmstrom (1982). For a discussion of their application in this context see Leonard (1998b, pp.
8-12).
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each unit exerted (there is a relatively low cost to exerting the first unit of effort
or no increasing returns to scale for effort) then there is some share small enough,
but greater than zero for which it makes sense (in terms of expected outcome) for
the client to increase the share paid to the practitioner. In this way the patient will
decrease her effort a little and the practitioner will increase his effort a little and the
expected outcome will improve. Thus we demonstrate that some sharing is better
than no sharing, when budgets are balanced7.
Under different sets of restrictions contracts that do achieve the full informa-
tion solution are possible. Since budget-balanced sharing-rule contracts fall short
of the full information solution, this admits the possibility of another class of con-
tracts that do better than sharing-rule contracts. We will show later that relaxing
the condition that payments are conservative allows contracts to achieve the full
information solution.
We turn now to the issue of enforceability: though contingent-payment contracts
are improvements on the agency problem there are important conditions that must
be met before they can be used.
3.5 Enforceability and Verifiability
Though many aspects of effort are unobservable, we have claimed that outcomes
are observable. Unfortunately for most contracts in which payments are contingent
on the observation of outcome, outcomes need to be verifiable as well as observ-
able. Thus outcomes must be observable to a third party such as a court that can
adjudicate disputes in the resolution of contracts.
When outcomes are not verifiable contracts are generally not enforceable because
the practitioner or the client might refuse to honor the contract. In the case of the
contingent payment contract introduced above the client is supposed to make an
additional payment to the practitioner if the outcome is good. However she no
longer has an incentive to make that payment because the outcome is not observed
by any institution that can enforce payment or punish lying. If the practitioner
7A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.
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anticipates that a contract is unenforceable, he will not accept it or will exert effort
as if his incentives were guided only by fixed payments. We have said that, in the
absence of other institutions, contingent-payment contracts reduce agency costs,
benefiting both practitioners and clients. Therefore the client is hurt by her ability
to violate the contract. If she were able to bind herself to always tell the truth or
could utilize a technology that made outcomes verifiable she would be better off.
The success of the traditional healer contract depends on the fact that the suc-
cess of the outcome is effectively verifiable and therefore the contract is enforceable.
In principle the patient could deny that she had been successfully treated and refuse
to make contingent payments. However, most Africans believe that the healer has
the spiritual powers to know the true outcome of the treatment (or is the agent
of spirits with such powers) and that he can invoke supernatural punishment on
those who seek to cheat him. Patients believe outcomes are verifiable (that 'pow-
ers' observe the outcome) and this binds them to tell the truth. Thus, although
contingent contracts reduce agency costs, modern medical practitioners usually lack
the traditional healer's ability to enter into enforceable contracts and are unable to
transact business in this way.
A 'modern' medicine variant of the contingent contract was observed for mater-
nities by Ndeso-Atanga (1999) in his study for our project in Cameroun. With the
severe decline in real government salaries from Africa's prolonged economic crisis,
an informal convention has developed in Cameroun that the family pay a substantial
'appreciation' to the government clinic mid-wife after the successful delivery of a
healthy child. This outcome is readily observable and verifiable to all the parties
to the transaction, and the payment is made before the mother and child leave the
clinic (further aiding enforcement). The existence of a contract that creates incen-
tives for effort on the part of the mid-wife has dramatic effects. There is no doubt
that government hospitals and clinics in Cameroun have staff and facilities with a
medical capacity equal to or greater than that of the missions. For a whole range
of illnesses, however, substantial numbers of people go to missions because they be-
lieve that the quality of effort exerted by their staff will be superior to that of their
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government counterparts. Since the maternity contingent contract is able to induce
that effort in government clinics, however, the numbers of people going to missions
for deliveries is dramatically lower (3% vs. 30% for other conditions).
3.6 Unverifiable Outcomes
In most types of medical transactions outcomes are not verifiable and therefore
contracts are not as easily enforced as in the preceding two circumstances. Are there
institutional mechanisms that can assure effort in these, more typical circumstances?
We examine institutions that allow enforcement of contingent payment contracts
without verifiability and institutions that insure effort using mechanisms other than
contingent contracts.
3.6.1 Reputation
Though they are uncommon, there exist practitioners who provide high quality
effort despite the absence of incentives to do so. They might have a taste for ex-
erting effort or derive utility from the utility of the population they serve. The
socialization literature, particularly for professionals, examines processes that seek
to create individuals who exert effort independent of direct incentives but the mech-
anisms have high probability of success only when reinforced by other indirect in-
centives (Leonard 1991, Chap. 12);(Preidson 1970). There is no evidence that such
indirect mechanisms operate effectively for government and private medical prac-
titioners in Africa. Hence in Africa we are concerned strictly with 5e//-motivated
practitioners.
With imperfect information, however, such an 'extraordinary' (as we shall refer
to him) practitioners attracts more clients- because they can count on his effort
without observing it. Therefore potentially he could earn a higher income. This
higher income is not why he behaves as he does but it is possible that an ordinary
practitioner could benefit by seeking to imitate an 'extraordinary' practitioner. In
this light we model reputation as the changing beliefs of clients such that, correctly
or incorrectly, they believe a given practitioner will always provide effort no matter
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what the incentives are in a given interaction. Clients have a prior belief about
the probability that they are dealing with an 'extraordinary' practitioner and this
belief can be changed by observing the outcomes of many interactions with the same
practitioner.
Practitioners who practice in a limited geographical area can gain a reputation
when patients observe a long string of mostly positive outcomes from treatments (no
practitioner can always achieve good outcomes). We consider a 'good' practitioner
to be one who is imitating an 'extraordinary' practitioner. 'Good' practitioners still
experience disutility of effort. When a practitioner arrives in an area that has no
information about his type he faces a choice either of acting rationally in the context
of each interaction or of forgoing current consumption, providing effort and hoping
to gain a reputation. His practice when he has a 'good' reputation must offer some
reward that is worth waiting for.
Again, assume \i = a, that a e {0,1} and that clients have a prior belief, po
of the type of practitioner they are dealing with, po varies between 0 ('ordinary')
and 1 ('extraordinary') and can be updated for each observed treatment, such that
pn is the belief as to the type after n observations of treatment. The initial prior
should reflect the client's knowledge of the distribution of kinds of practitioners. We
assume clients update their beliefs using a Bayesian updating process. This follows
the model outlined by Kreps and Wilson (1982) of the decision making process of
a firm trying to decide whether or not to enter a market when the established firm
may or may not be (or be imitating) a 'crazy' firm that irrationally protects market
share with price-cutting. All potential clients in a given area know the history of
every past visit to a particular practitioner, i.e. all potential clients have the same
prior belief at any moment in time. If beliefs were not updated it would never be
rational to try to gain a good reputation.8
Figure 1 shows how the prior is updated for a few different types of distribution
8This differs from the reputation model of Satterthwaite (1979) and Pauly and Satterthwaite
(1981) in that the cost of gathering information is basically zero. Their model examines the cost
of gathering information when there are differing numbers of practitioners. In our environment the
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Figure 1: Belief updating with observation of outcome
functions over outcomes, (X) and two different initial priors, po. In all three cases
the practitioner is trying to gain a reputation by exerting effort. The zig-zag of the
curve shows the random element of outcome despite consistent effort.
When clients think 10% of the practitioners they observe are likely to be 'ex-
traordinary' and there is a sizeable spread between p\ and ph (line A) clients discover
that the practitioner is 'good' relatively quickly, although far from immediately. Of
greater importance than the number of observations required for convergence to cer-
tainty is the slope of the 'belief curve', implying that practitioners see some rewards
from their strategy relatively quickly. In contrast when the spread is tighter (the
return to effort is lower) updating occurs at a slower rate (line B) . When clients
are pessimistic about the profession (po = 0.02) updating occurs at a very slow rate,
despite the effort exerted (line C).
What is the benefit to a practitioner of imitation? The true, underlying, value
of visiting either an 'extraordinary' or a 'good' practitioner is constant, but the
expected value is rising and falling with pn. The immediate effect of an increase in
the expected value is not necessarily an increase in the price that can be charged,
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but an increase in the number of visits. Clients weigh the perceived value of a visit
against its cost, and as the value increases we expect more conditions to meet the
threshold condition to initiate a visit. This effect is clearly visible in veterinary
medicine. Ly (1999b) has found that clients purchase more, and a greater variety
of services from practitioners in whom they have confidence than from other prac-
titioners. It is possible that under certain market conditions the practitioner could
extract higher fees from clients as beliefs about him changed, further increasing the
returns to reputation. However, this might serve as signal to clients that a practi-
tioner is not 'extraordinary', since 'extraordinary' practitioners appear to clients to
be indifferent to market forces.
The strategy of imitating 'extraordinary' practitioners cannot be sustained in a
finite game. Since the 'good' practitioner is not 'extraordinary', the game unravels
from its end-period9. Even if the game has an infinite (or finite but unknown)
horizon it is not always clear that it makes sense to play 'good'. The unknown
horizon insures that there is always an expectation of future value from a 'good'
reputation, but at every stage this future value must exceed the cost of being 'good'.
There is an opportunity cost to the fact that clients do not know if a practitioner
is 'extraordinary' or 'good'. The area between any of the curves shown in Figure 1
and the line where po = 1, for all n (for line A this area is shown as the shaded area)
is a measure of the difference in revenues that could have been earned if patients
knew quality was high and the revenues earned while reputation is gained. If a
practitioner could assure patients he was of high quality he would not have to forgo
these revenues. Imagine that the payoffs to reputation are such that all practitioners
have an incentive to gain a reputation. If clients knew this, could po become 1?
Clients do not really care if a practitioner is 'good' or 'extraordinary', since both
behave in the same manner. So could they potentially view all practitioners as being
either 'extraordinary' or having incentives to imitate the 'extraordinary'?
Just as clients learn whether or not a practitioner is 'good' or 'extraordinary'
they would also learn that a practitioner is 'ordinary' (when most practitioners are
3For discussion of the properties of repeated games see Axelrod (1985).
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'good' perhaps a better term would be 'bad'.). An updating curve analogous to
those shown in Figure 1 would begin at the initial prior and fall to zero. The area
beneath such a curve would represent the benefit to being perceived as 'good' when
in fact a practitioner was 'bad'. As the prior rose the area underneath the updating
curve would also rise. However, every time a practitioner moved to a new area he
could begin with a new prior belief of his type. The temptation to move into an
area and then gain from the perception of being 'good' while in fact exerting no
effort becomes larger as the initial prior rises.
An equilibrium in which large numbers of practitioners are 'good' and are earning
income as if they were 'good' is sustainable if there is a sufficiently large cost to
moving to a new area and starting again. From the point of view of a client the
arrival of a new practitioner who could somehow bind himself to not moving would
be a signal that this practitioner was 'good'. The easiest way to bind oneself (in a
society in which courts do not function properly) is to invest in assets that are specific
to one individual's particular practice (Williamson 1985). Specific assets serve as a
type of bond, foregone if a practitioner leaves one practice to begin another.
What candidates for such specific assets exist? In a well functioning market
there are few assets that are specific to one practitioner in one place. The purchase
of medical equipment does not meet this test since it can easily be moved. The
construction of a laboratory is similarly not specific since the facility could be sold
to another practitioner. However when there are very few practices in a rural area
the construction of a laboratory is more of a specific investment because there are
few potential buyers and the building cannot be moved. (In the US MD's frequently
purchased the practices of 'good' physicians; if they then were 'bad' the sale value
of the practice would drop severely.
As we introduce potential solutions to imperfect information costs we must take
into account the fact that setup costs for private practice in rural Africa are already
seen as being too high. Though proper investment according to the above mechanism
could also increase the returns to the practice of medicine, we must recognize that
mechanisms that insure quality and thus higher revenues without requiring large
22
investment costs will naturally be more attractive. Thus there seems to be an
important opportunity for other mechanisms to insure quality other than reputation.
More common on the continent is 'brand name' reputation, whereby individual
missions and church denominations become known for high quality medical care.
We have observed missions being quite deliberate in the way they use their names
in medical markets and have witnessed the ability of the better ones to create in-
stant customer demand for facilities in new locations through this device (similar to
franchising)(K.L. Leonard, personal observation). In this way once a denomination
has gained a reputation for being 'good' they can extend their reach to new areas
without having to re-earn a reputation.
3.6.2 Repeated Interaction
As we have stated, contingent contracts with verifiable outcomes improve on the
solution obtained with only fixed payments. Thus if a contingent-payment contract
could be sustained, it is likely to lead to superior outcomes both in the short and
long run for both client and practitioner. There is a twist with sustaining contingent
contracts when the client agrees to pay the practitioner; it is the reputation of
the client that matters, not that of the practitioner. Under what conditions does
the client have incentives to truthfully reveal unverifiable outcomes even when it
increases the payment she must make without increasing her utility from treatment?
MacLeod and Malcomson (1982) observe that many contracts are written on
unverifiable outcomes and address our question.
[Pjiece rate [contingent] contracts are actually used, in many cases even
where the arrangements for recording output are sufficiently informal that
verifying it in court would be difficult. Moreover, in some jobs a substan-
tial part of pay takes the form of a performance-related bonus (in effect an
informal piece-rate [contingent-contract]) which employees expect to be
paid, and firms actually pay, despite there being no legal obligation to do
so. . . . The fundamental requirement for an implicit contract to be self-
enforcing is that there exist sufficient economic surplus from continuing it
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over what the parties can jointly get if it is terminated.
Thus when the client faces a more costly outside alternative to the relationship
with a particular practitioner she has an incentive to tell the truth. Recall that
with observable but unverifiable outcomes the practitioner knows whether or not
the client is telling the truth and can therefore refuse to do business (or refuse to
enter into certain types of contracts) with her in the future.
The enforceability of the contract with the possibility of repeated interactions
will depend on at least three things: the probability of needing the services of a
practitioner in the future; the additional cost incurred in seeking a new practitioner
(local monopoly increases this cost); and the value of the services provided (skill of
practitioner, expected disease conditions and in the case of animals, the value of the
animal). These factors help to explain why we observe contingent-payment contracts
in use among veterinarians but not among doctors. Veterinarians often enjoy a wider
geographical monopoly and transportation costs for animals are significantly higher
than for humans (Woods 1999). Furthermore we predict that areas with high value
animals or where herders have large herds (more interactions with the veterinarian
per client) are more likely to sustain contingent-payment contracts.
The interesting finding is that practitioners who enjoy some form of local monopoly
(even if only in their skill class) are more likely to be able to form contingent-
payment contracts, because they know clients have less incentive to lie about out-
comes. This increases their welfare, but it also increases the welfare of clients.
Thus breaking a local monopoly without introducing any other form of institutional
guarantee of quality could hurt, not benefit herders.
3.6.3 Budget—Breaking (non—conservative) Incentive Systems
Both of the above mentioned mechanisms allow an individual practitioner to get
around some of the problems posed by agency, while avoiding problems of enforce-
ability. However there exists a class of contracts that can both obviate the need
for verifiability and approach, if not achieve, the full information solution. These
require the existence of an individual other than the parties to the contract who can
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break the budget balance of payments.10 We will suggest that this third party role
is an important function of institutions.
The client lies when payment is required in an unverifiable contingent-payment
contract because after the outcome is observed payment can only decrease her utility.
If she says the outcome was bad, she doesn't change the outcome but makes no
payment. If she says the outcome was good, she does not improve the outcome but
must make a payment. One could ask the practitioner about the outcome but the
same problem would occur.
Consider instead that there are two transfers, not one. The payment made
(or not made) to the practitioner depends on the declaration of the client, but
the payment made (or not made) by the client depends on the declaration of the
practitioner. This requires a third party who can add or remove money when these
two payments do not match. Now the statement of the client does not change her
utility. She gets the value of the outcome and a payment that depends not on what
she says but on what the practitioner says. She has no reason to lie, and if we
assume a mild propensity to tell the truth she will tell the truth. By similar logic
the practitioner is induced to tell the truth. Now the outcome will be known and
payments can be made appropriately.
Imagine an arbitrator who cannot observe effort, but offers practitioner and client
a scheme as we have outlined. Both practitioner and client declare the outcome to
have been good and the arbitrator then requires the client to pay the practitioner
Px as set out in the original contract. The amount paid is exactly equal to the
amount received. However, this scheme is a non-conservative or budget-breaking
contract because it involves unequal payments off the equilibrium path. If the client
had chosen to lie she would still have to make a payment (this depends on the
declaration of the practitioner) but the practitioner would not receive the payment
— this is an unbalanced set of payments. Thus even with unverifiable outcomes, if
10In the general literature these mechanisms are referred to as Groves mechanisms (Clarke 1971,
Groves 1973). The role of budget-breaking in multiple agent problems was advanced by Holmstrom
(1982). Budget-breaking is also cited as a mechanism for insurance companies to reduce the costs
of moral hazard in insurance by Ellis and McGuire (1990, pp 377).
25
(but only if) the budget does not have to be balanced a contract can be sustained
that makes payment contingent on outcome.
Super-Principals and the Role of Institutions In order to break a budget a
third party (whom we will refer to as the super-principal) is required who can inject
or remove payments when necessary. The super-principal does not perform any
action that contributes to treatment and does not need to observe the outcome of
treatment. We suggest that this is the primary role of an organization that employs
practitioners (both government and mission, human and animal health services).
Breaking the budget gets around the problem of verifiability but it also improves
on the utility of both parties when both client and practitioner effort are unobserv-
able: the full information solution can be achieved. A simple example of this is a
contract where both client and practitioner receive the full value of the marginal
outcome. The practitioner receives a contingent payment Px = uX — ujlph + Pp,
where PF is a fixed payment and cofiph is the expected value of the outcome when
effort is exerted. The client, on the other hand makes a fixed payment of Pp and
the value to the client of treatment is uX — Pp. Both client and practitioner face
the marginal value of the outcome and therefore have high powered incentives to
exert effort. Thus by being a member of an organization that can break budgets
practitioners can achieve solutions superior to those of practitioners who are not
members of such organizations.
Signal Technologies In this form of contract the payment to the client can
be made without knowing the outcome of treatment. Since she retains the value of
the treatment, that is her payment. Furthermore it is not necessary that payment
to the practitioner be directly tied to the outcome of treatment. Any signal will
achieve the same solution if it is correlated with the outcome of treatment such that
a contract can be written that leads to the same incentives for the practitioner. For
example, if the practitioner is paid, not on the basis of one outcome, but on the
average outcome of two or more treatments, the payments can be designed such
that he faces the same incentives.
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This is an important modification to the class of potential contracts because,
despite the fact that with broken budgets clients can be induced to tell the truth,
there are significant transaction costs to gathering information about outcomes.
Outcomes are frequently not known until well after the administration of treat-
ment, and patients (animals or people) have generally returned home by this point.
The presence of transaction costs requires that organizations choose between signal
technologies that differ by correlation to outcomes and cost of collection.
Budget breaking institutions use signal technologies to reduce transaction costs
but any technology available to an organization is also available to an individual
practitioner or an organization that does not break budgets. Their use in this
latter case, however, would introduce another transaction cost as well as forcing the
client to bear extra risk. One potential signal is the outcome of a randomly chosen
treatment from among a large set of treatments. This reduces transaction costs
by reducing data collection requirements and if the practitioner does not know, a
priori, which treatment will be selected and payments are appropriately scaled he
faces the same incentives to provide effort as if clients were polled on outcomes for
every treatment. Now, if budgets are balanced, each client must be approached
after the chosen outcome is known and asked to make the appropriate payment. If
the outcome was good each client will be asked to make the contingent-payment
that was part of the original contract. If it was bad, money might be returned to
them. Class action lawsuits in the US operate in basically this manner. This re-
introduces, however, the exact transaction costs that this technology was supposed
to help organizations avoid. Furthermore, except for the client whose treatment was
randomly chosen the risk to which clients are exposed has increased11. Potentially
the client could be faced with both a bad outcome and the imposition of an extra
payment, a double penalty.
Though observed institutions use both budget-breaking and outcome-correlated
signals, we suggest that the comparative advantage of organizational provision comes
in their ability to break budgets. The existing and potential institutions we discuss
lWe had assumed risk neutral clients but relax the assumption slightly here.
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below differ in many aspects of their practices but all break budgets and collect
correlated signals rather than information about outcomes.
Organizational Quality The technology of information collection most com-
monly observed in Africa and throughout the world is direct monitoring of the
practitioner. The employer of the practitioner does not seek to know the outcome
of treatment but does observe other outcomes that give information about the effort
of the provider. Practitioners produce both health for the patient and what we call
organizational quality. This second output is observed by the employer. Records are
kept of the various activities that go into producing health. Typically a selection of
records are examined during a site visit. The patients' symptoms and complaints
are part of all records and therefore procedures and records should follow proto-
cols developed for each set of complaints. If a particular record or collection of
records is determined to be in violation of standards, the practitioner is punished
in accordance with the gravity of the deviation. (One of the major steps forward
in assuring medical quality in the US was the creation of the Joint Commission
of Medical Accreditation standards for medical records (Savage 1997, Langlois and
Savage 1997)).
Organizational quality is a measure specifically designed to be highly correlated
with outcomes. It does, however, include some information that is deliberately dif-
ferent from outcomes. For example, prescribing too many drugs (poly-pharmacy)
decreases organizational quality but usually does not affect individual health out-
comes. Organizations monitor this activity in an attempt to 'internalize' the exter-
nality imposed by excessive use, for example, of antibiotics. In this way the signal
of organizational quality might be superior to the signal provided by outcomes. On
the other hand, organizational quality ignores patient effort. Examination of records
would show that correct diagnostic procedures were used and that correct medicines
were prescribed but they would be unable to show whether or not the patient took
her medicines correctly. Thus a practitioner evaluated on the basis of organizational
quality will be less likely to encourage patient effort than a practitioner evaluated
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on the basis of outcomes.
This prediction is confirmed by the results of observations of 450 consultations
in both church and government health facilities in Tanzania12. In only 16% of
observations did the doctor tell the patient what the diagnosis was or what medicine
was being prescribed. In only 6% of cases did the doctor inform the patient of any
activity she could undertake to increase the chance of recovery or to avoid a similar
illness in the future. Of cases in which a dispensing nurse gave the patient drugs
requiring that the patient know how or when to take the drug in only 32% did the
nurse check to see if the patient had any idea how to do so. These observations
confirm that despite the emphasis these organizations put on health education,
organizational quality does not create strong incentives to encourage patient effort.
Non—Conservative Institutions for the Provision of Medicine We have
stated that regulation by the state does not, and is unlikely to, function properly
in Africa due to constraints on the administrative capacity of most African govern-
ments. Here we explore other institutions that can play a regulatory role. These
institutions all break budget balance in that the rewards or punishment of practi-
tioners are independent of the payments made by clients.
Self—Regulation Unlike Prance and many African countries that rely on the
state to regulate the practice of medical professionals, Anglo-Saxon countries instead
have relied upon self-regulation by professional associations, which not only control
licenses but hospital privileges as well. Due in part to very small private markets
and in part to statist traditions, professional self-regulation has been quite weak
in Africa north of Zimbabwe. The agency literature on health discussed earlier in
this paper predicts that as private medical markets emerge professional associations
would become strong regulators so as to enable their members to collect the higher
prices the market would pay for the assurance of quality effort (Pratt and Zeckhauser
12K.L. Leonaxd participated in research sponsored and carried out by Dr Mpuya under the
auspices of the District Medical Office of Iringa, Tanzania with the support of Centro Universitario
Aspiranti Medici Missionari.
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1985, pp. 19-29; Arrow 1963, 1985, pp. 38, 40). Ly (1999a) examined this hypothe-
sis in Senegal for our project. There was a special reason to expect that professional
self-regulation would emerge for full doctors of veterinary medicine (DVMs) in that
country; the down-sizing of the state had forced large numbers of veterinary practi-
tioners into the market and the political power of the union representing veterinary
para-professionals had won them the legal right to practice in competition with
DVMs. Full vets therefore had a particularly strong need to convince the livestock
producer that paying a premium for their services would purchase higher quality.
DVMs did create a professional body that gained state recognition, but they have
not made a meaningful effort to regulate one another. Ly concludes that the agency
literature underestimated the collective action problem of such regulation. There
is a premium to self-regulation but it is gained by all members of the profession.
The creation of the necessary mechanism would require a level of effort from leading
DVMs that would exceed the benefits they personally would obtain.
Referral Networks In our opening literature review, we noted the suggestion
that referral networks fulfill much the same function as self-regulation by profes-
sional associations but in an informal and less costly manner. Such networks are
essentially non-existent in Africa. Patients very often self-refer to higher-level facil-
ities, the referrals that are made are to facilities and not to individual practitioners,
and interaction between the referring practitioner and the specialist does not oc-
cur (Sauerborn et al. 1989, K.L. Leonard, personal observation). This observation
does not preclude such an institution's emerging at some point in the future; it does
function effectively in the United States. But it is not a part of the solution to the
quality of effort problem in contemporary Africa. We will return to the potential
for referral networks in the discussion of adverse selection.
Hierarchical Supervision Most of Africa therefore lacks institutional struc-
tures that would solve the imperfect information problem for medical markets as a
whole. The problem can be and is resolved within the context of specific organiza-
tions, however, where hierarchical supervision can take the place of contracts and
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professional regulation. Government and church-run (mission) health systems are
therefore players within the institution we call organizational provision. Both gov-
ernments and missions collect information on organizational quality, but government
health systems fail to take advantage of their institutional context. Hierarchical su-
pervision in government does not function effectively, as it is too difficult to fire
practitioners for deficiencies, the personnel systems are either too bureaucratic or
too politicized to reward good performance, and supervisors have too little incentive
to overcome the inertia of the system.
Hierarchical supervision does work effectively to assure quality effort in the
health facilities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), most of which are run
by churches or missions. Service tends to feature prominently among the preferences
of the leadership of these NGOs, so it derives satisfaction from exercising the strong
supervision needed to gain staff effort. These general NGO motives for quality are
even stronger for church-related facilities, for church leadership expects to derive the
tangible and intangible benefits of increased membership from having a strong ser-
vice reputation and interacting with clientele using their facilities. These incentives
and the supervision that follows from them assure a type of quality medical effort
on the part of mission medical staff. This is an area in which Africa has a readily
available, highly-functional institution for dealing with moral hazard.
It is very clear that mission health facilities have a strong market position in
most African countries and that many people are prepared to pay a premium over
government facility charges in order to use them. This quality premium can not
be due to superior mission capacity, for staff qualifications and equipment in NGO
facilities typically is equal to or worse than those in their government counter-
parts (Mliga 1999, Leonard 1999). It could be due, however, to aspects of observable
effort, such as better drug supplies and superior 'clinical manner' (Mliga 1999, Bich-
mann et al. 1991, Litvack and Bodart 1993, Omorodion 1993, Stock 1983, Wadding-
ton and Enyimayew 1989). To demonstrate that mission facilities also are attractive
because they help to solve the moral hazard problem, we need to show that a client
is most likely to chose one of them as her agent when she knows that unobservable
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dimensions of quality of medical effort, and not just capacity and observable aspects
of effort, are desirable for her particular medical condition. To prove that missions
serve as an institution to reduce the imperfect information problem we therefore
also must examine the extent to which African patients have any knowledge of their
medical needs.
3.7 Self-Diagnosis
The medical model almost certainly overstates the extent of the imperfect informa-
tion problem; in Africa the patient does know something about her condition and
what is appropriate to it. We have noted earlier that Africans are making choices
between medical providers based on their own understanding of their illnesses. The
question is not whether these choices are being exercised but whether they are based
on some real knowledge and therefore are good choices.
If medical effort were observable patients would seek providers who had the
appropriate skill at the lowest cost and then insure that the necessary effort was
exerted. Government-run facilities are clearly the least expensive in terms of fees,
drug costs and travel costs for the majority of patients. Therefore, if skills, ca-
pacity and drug supplies are adequate at government facilities, we would expect to
see clients visiting government clinics and being referred to government hospitals
when necessary, or, if the delay was substantial, self-referring to hospitals. Visits
to mission clinics or hospitals would occur only when the difference in travel costs
was such that it was less expensive to visit mission clinics or hospitals. However,
in a study undertaken in Cameroun, deliberately chosen to coincide with a German
Technical Agency project to insure adequate drug supply and facilities at govern-
ment operated clinics and hospitals we found no evidence of patterns of visits along
these lines (Leonard 1999, Ndeso-Atanga 1999). Seventy-nine percent of all visits
were to a provider who was not the closest one. Of the visits to clinics and hospitals
only 53% were to the closest clinic or hospital. Of visits to hospitals 39% involved
patients traveling past a government hospital to visit a mission hospital.
If some elements of effort are unobservable then different patterns of visits can
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emerge. We have stated that the contingent-payment contract of the traditional
healer fails to achieve the full information solution, though it is an improvement on
treatment without contracts. The contract available at organizational providers can
potentially be superior to that of the traditional healer, but it downplays the role of
patient effort in treatment. Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) theorize that three different
forms of land-labor contracts (sharecropping, land rental and wage labor) co-exist
because each form of contract is particularly appropriate for certain types of crops.
They suggest that crops differ in the extent to which they require unobservable
inputs from laborers and landowners. By analogy we can consider diseases to be like
production technologies that differ in the degree to which they require unobservable
inputs from medical practitioners and patients and then can show that different
forms of contracts are appropriate for different diseases.
Expanding the formulation of the technology that produces health, /i, we in-
troduce two new variables that differ by disease, the responsiveness of the disease
condition to medical effort, 7, and the responsiveness of the disease condition to
patient effort, 6. Given the existence of two different institutions between which
to choose and the existence of two different organizations within the institution of
'modern' medicine, patients make their choices based on costs, as well as their own
estimate of the value of these two parameters, 7 and S.
Leonard (1998b) assumes that the production of health takes the form of a
Cobb-Douglas production function such that fi = (cnr)^(br))° where S + 7 < 1 and
77 is the skill level of the patient. 7 and 5 are quantitative values given for each
disease condition from a medical evaluation of the symptoms and characteristics of
the patient. The parameters of the various contracts can then be recovered from
observed choices. Figure 2 shows the predictions of visits when the skill of various
providers in the treatment of certain conditions as well as the skill of patients are
held constant.
The results of this and other empirical investigations (Leonard 1998a) suggest
that patients simulate a type of imperfect market for health care by choosing between
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Figure 2: Two dimensional projection of disease characteristics
aware of the incentive effects of various institutional structures and act accordingly.
We do not suggest that poor, uneducated patients are unfailingly choosing the
appropriate place to go for medical treatment. The African literature does suggest
that self-referrals to hospitals, by-passing primary care facilities, are often wasteful.
But the same literature also can be read as suggesting that self-referrals often are
appropriate, that there is error on both sides (Mwabu 1986, Vogel 1993, p. 93). The
fact that hospitals generally are more distant than clinics means that self-referrals
are costly in time and transport for the sick, and therefore are unlikely to be chosen
if they are believed to be unnecessary.
Moral hazard in the provision of health services creates agency costs for both the
client and practitioner. When this problem is not resolved by either institution or
contract we find practitioners who specialize in the sale of Pharmaceuticals (observ-
ables) but do not use their skills as diagnosticians (unobservable) - a widespread
phenomenon in the privatization of both veterinary and human health services in
Africa. There exist some solutions to this problem that do not require institutions
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(the credit/ contingent-contract system of veterinarians with local monopolies) or
for which viable institutions have long existed (the contingent contract of traditional
healers). There are, as well, many organizations that independently make use of the
institution of hierarchical supervision to resolve these issues. However the extension
of health care (or veterinary) services in Africa will rely on the existence of perva-
sive institutions that allow modern practitioners to be paid for the skills that they
possess. We have shown that government supervision has been ineffective and that
it is unlikely to become more effective. Self-regulation by professional associations
has not become an effective institution and we see little reason to believe that it will
become more so. We will discuss referral networks in greater detail in the section
on adverse selection.
4 Adverse Selection
We turn now from the moral hazard problem to one that is related, especially in
practice — adverse selection. In markets with imperfect information about skills,
higher-cost quality providers have difficulty surviving. If they are unable to demon-
strate the superior quality of their capacity and effort and to persuade patients of its
relevance to their conditions, a 'market for lemons' will exist in which lower-price,
low quality practitioners will compete them out of existence (Akerloff 1970).
Currently in rural Africa, where the presence of private practitioners of human
medicine is small, clients tend to associate skill levels with the location in which one
practices. Hospitals and their staff are differentiated from clinics and their staff.
However, for private practitioners to succeed patients must be able to discern their
skill without the aid of an established organizational setting. Whether this is the
only block to the establishment of more extensive private medical practice is not
clear, but resolving this issue has already become a top priority of private veterinary
medicine.
Unlike practitioners in human health, veterinarians either visit herders in the
field or work on their own away from buildings and physical facilities that might
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suggest skill levels. Our project's studies of the emerging private veterinary markets
in Senegal and Uganda show that full vets (DVMs) are having difficulty competing
effectively against their para-professional counterparts (Ly 1999a, Koma 1999). In
Uganda DVMs enjoyed no price premium over para-vets when they performed the
same procedures. Their sole market advantage came when they provided services
or did operations of which their less-qualified competitors were incapable, despite
the fact that their training as diagnosticians should increase the value even of these
simpler services.
4.1 Solutions
If clients can correctly identify the skill level of a given practitioner and that ad-
ditional skill is worth its extra cost both the practitioner and the client will gain
from its identification. The returns to skill appear to be high enough in human
health care to justify its use. The value of skill in veterinary medicine, however,
differs from region to region (with varying market prices for meat and dairy prod-
ucts and the type of animals). Still, even in the areas with the highest value for
animals, when appropriate institutional guarantees of skill are absent, higher skill
professionals suffer, whereas in areas with proportionately lower valued animals the
existence of institutions that solve the problem of adverse selection lead to higher
uses of professionals (Ly 1999a, Koma 1999).
In this section we investigate some possible solutions to the adverse selection
problem and discuss their potential in the African context.
4.1.1 Labeling
The most common way in which quality providers seek to prevent adverse selection
and establish a market share for themselves is through the way in which they present
themselves to the public. Professional associations publicize the value of certain
kinds of qualifications, certify those who possess them and prosecute those who
falsely claim them, while the individual practitioner advertises that he is so qualified.
Though labeling can involve public education of the benefit of qualifications, its most
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important role is to allow differentiation. If skill has benefit any label attached to a
high skilled practitioner that cannot be borne by a low skill practitioner will mitigate
the adverse selection problem.
This version of labeling has not worked well in Africa, for subsidized medical
organizations have had a motive to obscure these distinctions, as we have seen. This
deficiency is reversible, but only with considerable effort by professional associations,
which we have already characterized as suffering from collective action problems in
Africa. Even if differences in medical qualifications were better known to the public,
however, they would signal only differences in capacity, not the medical effort which
we have argued is so important.
4.1.2 Signaling
A second way in which providers can counter the tendency to adverse selection in
markets characterized by imperfect information is by 'signaling' their higher qual-
ity. This mechanism involves doing or showing things that high skill practitioners
find easy (inexpensive) and inferior ones find difficult (expensive.) Spence (1974)
suggested a form of game in which workers invest in education, not to improve their
productivity, but to signal their productivity. If education is more expensive for the
low ability type than for the high ability type (schooling has a greater disutility),
there can exist an equilibrium in which only high ability types seek additional edu-
cation and employers can know by looking at the level of education exactly the type
of worker they are hiring and pay accordingly — even if education itself serves no
productive purpose in the workplace.
The use of observable procedures that are associated only with higher levels
of training and expertise, such as surgery, are one example. It would be difficult
for a para-professional to learn to open and close an incision successfully in the
presence of witnesses, whereas a full medical professional has already been taught
how to do it. Koma (1999) did find that as private veterinary practice emerged
in Uganda full vets would be known for their ability to do surgery, even among
livestock owners who could not tell how their credentials differed from those of
37
para-professionals. Medical practitioners who want to establish a reputation for
skill therefore would find it desirable to occasionally perform surgery in a highly
visible setting. To do so on humans (but not animals) requires access to a hospital,
and thus hospital privileges become another signaling device. Note that in this
example, the role of hospital access is not to provide additional revenue, but to
provide information to potential clients — who do not need surgery — about the
skill of the practitioner. Another example of signaling is the use of microscopes to
examine blood slides and the presence and use of other expensive pieces of medical
equipment. This mechanism is visible in the de-facto privatization of the Chinese
medical system, where county hospitals that are financially hard-pressed have been
observed to invest in expensive new equipment in order to attract patients away
from other facilities (Chen 1997, Tang 1997). Some Kenyan vets are sought out
by pastoralists because of their use of sophisticated diagnostic procedures (D.K.
Leonard, personal observation). Koma (1999) concluded that the failure of full vets
in Uganda to purchase and use the expensive diagnostic tools in which they had been
trained was one of the sources of their difficulty in establishing market position and
avoiding adverse selection.
4.1.3 Separating Contracts
It is possible for the client to offer a contract that induces practitioners to truthfully
declare their type, or skill level. Assume \i — n • a, IT G {1,2}, a £ {1,2}, and
c(a) = a. There are two types of practitioners, those with low and those with
high skill. An element of a is observable and therefore can be purchased in a spot
contract. Thus at least one unit of a is provided, but the second unit is unobservable.
The client does not know the skill level of the provider but offers the following two
contracts to practitioners, designed such that the high skill practitioner will always
choose the second contract and the low skill practitioner will always choose the first
contract. The first contract is a fixed fee contract, P = 1, and the second contract
is a contingent-payment contract P = 1 + Px • The contingent-payment contract
is designed by looking at the payoffs of practitioners, which are as follows for both
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skill types
exert effort don't exert effort
P ( ) > 1
Thus if Px is chosen to fall strictly within this range
- ^ < P X < ^ (7)
Ph ~Pl Ph~ Pi
the high skill practitioner will benefit by the second contract and the low skill prac-
titioner will loose by it. We do not expect one client to offer to an unknown prac-
titioner a choice of contracts. Rather, using animal care as an example, we predict
that herders with valuable animals that have unfamiliar ailments or require compli-
cated procedures will offer a contingent contract and attract high skill practitioners
and that otherwise herders will offer a fixed fee contract and attract practitioners
with lower levels of skill. (The latter is clear in Uganda from Koma (1999), and
the former is strongly implied by personal field observations of David Leonard and
George Njiru in Kenya.)
4.1.4 Referral Networks
The fourth solution involves the development of meaningful referral networks. We
noted earlier that these are not functioning effectively in Africa at present. Nonethe-
less they are the mechanism whereby most real professional self-regulation and en-
hancement of the quality of practice takes place in the United States (Preidson 1970,
Savage 1997). Since they are networks of participating professionals rather than or-
ganizations, their creation can be more decentralized and accomplished at lower cost
than many of the other moral hazard and adverse selection solutions we have dis-
cussed in this paper. It therefore is worth exploring further how professional referral
networks work and what the prospects may be for their emergence in Africa. Frei-
dson (1970) found in the US that physicians tend to develop networks of relations
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with others similar in quality to themselves. Because medical personnel are better
trained to understand the nature of one another's work and because they see many
more examples of the outcomes of their colleagues' treatments, they are in a much
better position to overcome the imperfect information problem of medicine than is
the average patient and to evaluate accurately the technical capacity and quality of
effort of their fellow practitioners. Thus if frequent interaction teaches the patient
that their primary care physician provides a quality of care that they regard as sat-
isfactory, they can use that MD's referrals to find other medical providers of similar
quality. Haas-Wilson (1990) shows that (for psychotherapy services) referred prac-
titioners earn higher fees, a result compatible with the idea that referrals identify
superior practitioners.
Savage (1997) shows that these networks perform functions for professionals be-
yond providing mutual referrals of business. In fact professionals learn from one
another in their network relationships and through their interactions collectively
become more competent — testing insights and learning new procedures and de-
velopments in the field. She calls this creation of new knowledge 'professional co-
production' and argues that it represents one of the distinct advantages of profes-
sional knowledge systems. These self-organizing referral networks are rarely visible
in African health and veterinary systems, however. There seem to be several reasons
why this is so.
(a) Historically veterinary systems were subsidized and human health systems
still are. This created an excess demand for the more highly qualified practitioners.
The response was to blur distinctions among personnel, so that the cheaper staff,
with lower qualifications, could take up the slack. There is an attempt to get patients
to enter these system at the level of the cheaper providers, where the simpler cases
can be filtered out. The function being fulfilled here is an efficiency, not a quality
enhancing one (Vogel 1993, p. 93). When referrals are made they are made to
facilities, not to particular practitioners. Given the depersonalized character of these
relationships, there is very little personal interaction or even communication among
medical practitioners about the cases they have shared. Thus there is no learning,
40
no 'professional co-production' of knowledge, and little information generated that
might teach personnel about one another's quality.
(b) To the extent that referrals take place across levels in the government and
mission systems (health and veterinary) they are between subordinates and those
who are their supervisors or are closely connected to them. It is a well-established
principle of organizational behavior that communication takes place more readily
and accurately between peers than up a hierarchy (Blau 1955).
(c) The sharing of knowledge (both about medicine and about one another)
takes place most effectively through informal and frequent personal interactions.
Large numbers of professional staff in the African health and veterinary systems are
working in isolation. Hospitals don't exist for veterinary medicine, (human) health
practitioners in clinics don't have hospital privileges, and rural hospitals tend to
have very small professional staffs. Until medical professionals in Africa interact
more with one another, in non-hierarchical settings, and with the possibility of per-
sonalized referrals, the professional networks that recognize, reward and encourage
quality are not likely to emerge.
It does seem possible that the increased commercialization of African medical
systems may cause this to occur. Since such networks can be organized in decen-
tralized, low-cost ways, they seem more likely to emerge than self-regulation by
professional associations, which is troubled with collective action problems. Partic-
ularly in veterinary medicine, where both DVMs and par a-vets have been thrown
into the private market, it seems reasonable to hope that such networks will be
created. DVMs are finding it difficult to compete with para-vets, for it is irrational
for the livestock owner to pay them extra to do something a para-vet can do. They
need para-vets to refer to them the cases that need higher order skills, and the para-
professionals will want to serve their clients with better quality referrals. DVMs will
eventually realize that they can't make a living by doing procedures that are appro-
priate to para-vets and will want to have a set of these para-professionals to whom
they can recommend their clients as well. At the same time, as time progresses the
para-vets will begin to suffer from being cut off from further developments in their
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fields and would benefit from the opportunity to advance themselves professionally
by learning from DVMs. Thus mutually symbiotic relationships that enhance qual-
ity should and could emerge at low cost. They have not yet done so in Uganda
(Koma 1999), but the evolution of the veterinary market there is still young. Ly
(1999b) did observe such a network between a DVM and para-vets created by a
mission in Senegal's Ferlo. The result of the assurance of quality that comes from
a well-functioning referral network was at least a doubling in herder purchase of
preventive treatments from par a-vets.
It will be harder for the same spontaneous development of referral networks to
take place in human health, where large, subsidized organizations dominate medical
provision. More organizational effort will be required in these settings, but we
believe that as the subsidy element of these systems declines, particularly in the
mission ones, the competitive pressures to provide quality service to one's clientele
will make them increasingly likely.
Of the solutions mentioned above to the problem of adverse selection, two (sig-
naling and separating contracts) can be sustained by an individual practitioner. We
are not aware of conclusive evidence to show that such schemes are being used in
Africa (especially in the context of veterinary medicine), but we have observed be-
havior compatible with signaling. Labeling and referral networks require some level
of coordinated effort on the part of practitioners, though referral networks should
require less organization. Because the hurdle for organization is lower for referral
networks we are more likely to see successful attempts at this in the future.
5 Conclusion
Imperfect information in the provision of health services creates agency costs for
both the client and the practitioner. When this problem is not resolved by ei-
ther institution or contract we find (as we do currently in African privatization)
that many practitioners are specializing in the sale of Pharmaceuticals (observables)
but not using their skills as diagnosticians (unobservable). Autonomous and id-
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iosyncratic solutions to the agency problem in the provision of professional medi-
cal services abound in rural Africa. Some do not require institutions (the credit/
contingent-contract system of veterinarians with local monopolies) and others are
built on viable institutions that have long existed (the contingent-contract of tradi-
tional healers). However, they depend in large part on the existence of a particular
exogenous technological or institutional environment and therefore are difficult to
replicate. Furthermore, since client effort is important in the treatment of diseases,
these solutions are generally sub-optimal, suggesting a role for better institutional
mechanisms.
We identify, through theory and comparison to the west, three forms of insti-
tutions that might do a better job of solving the problem. We dismiss government
regulation because the regulatory capacity does not exist in most African coun-
tries. Self-regulation, by professional bodies, is a very attractive option and theory
suggests that such regulation should arise as privatization continues. However, em-
pirical evidence suggests that this conclusion is over-optimistic. There are significant
collective action problems to the formation of self-regulatory bodies and since these
organizations require (by their very definition) centralized control, we are pessimistic
that these problems can be overcome in the present African context. On the other
hand, referral networks perform much the same function but do not require central-
ized control. For this reason, we hold out the hope that they will yet spontaneously
form, or that they can be coaxed into existence.
The role of Missions The most successful institution for the delivery of quality
medical care in Africa is that of independent, pre-existing value-based organizations
that use the institution of hierarchical supervision to insure quality. This result
parallels a large body of empirical and theoretical work on health care in the US,
where non-profit hospitals frequently arise in discussions of quality. Many authors
have suggested that non-profit administrators maximize over different variables than
for-profit administrators (Newhouse 1970, Pauly and Resisch 1973). We certainly
believe that the bishop of a church does not operate health services with the simple
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goal of earning profits. However, in Africa, we do not have enough for-profit hospitals
to draw any conclusions about the role of missions specifically as non-profits.
The existence of missions hospitals and health services is an invaluable resource
that should be tapped to its fullest potential and encouraged to grow. Many African
governments implicitly or explicitly block the expansion of these services, policies
that should be reconsidered. Some countries, such as Tanzania, effectively sub-
contract government subsidized care to missions, which are permitted to charge fees
but sell their services at below market prices. This arrangement makes effective
use of the missions ability to supervise their staff more effectively than government
does its. A more aggressive policy would be to allow and encourage mission services
to franchise by selling their name to individual practitioners. Such a policy should
require that only missions that operate health services can sell their name (otherwise
they would have no capacity to regulate) and that the person to whom the name
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A A Proof
Proposition: With unobservable efforts some output sharing between patients and
practitioners leads to a strictly superior expected outcome.
We simplify ujfi(ph- pi) to [i without loss of generality for simplicity of exposition.
The problem then is to maximize the expected net outcome (net of disutilities
of effort) subject to the incentive compatibility (I.C.) and individual rationality
contraints (I.R.) of the patient and the practitioner.
subject to
i _ ^ + T ^Q m e d i c a l )
b* e "em** (l -
 r)fjL - -d(b) - T (I.C. patient)
rfic(a) + T = Vm (I.R. medical)
(1 — r)/x — d(b) -T>Vp (I.R. patient)
where T is the transfer from the patient to the practitioner,
The use of the LDFC condition allows us to 'relax' the incentive compatibility
constraints and characterize them as first order conditions. Assuming the individ-
ual rationality constraint of the practitioner is binding the lagrangian is formed as
follows;
d
Using the envelope condition we solve for the change in utility with respect to a









which then leads to an expression of A2.
Note that
d d , d
and it should be clear that /zmr_,o^2 — 0. This makes sense since all of the incentives
to provide effort lie with the patient when the sharing rule is equal to zero the cost
of the incentive compatibility constraint is smaller and smaller. However Ai does
not go to zero as r goes to zero.
da2
Substituting both multipliers into the envelope condition we find
.2
This condition is positive given that there are increasing marginal costs to effort.
Note that the system is not solvable if this is not the case. Thus as r approaches zero
there is a benefit to increasing r. Note that this does not rely on any assumptions
about the sign of the cross partial of output with respect to a and b.
50
1998-99 Discussion Papers
Economics Department, Columbia University
9899-01 Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-experimental Causal Studies Dehejia, R.
9899-02 Institutional Solutions to the Principal-Agent Problem in African Health Care Leonard, K.
Leonard, D.
Page 1
